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FEATURE COMMENT: Empty Promise For
The Acquisition Workforce
In his confirmation hearings, David Safavian,
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
administrator, testified, “The strategic management of the human capital that makes up our acquisition workforce will be my number one priority.” 2004 WL 946219 (April 29, 2004). True to his
word, he promptly promulgated a new OFPP
Policy Letter 05-01, Developing and Managing the
Acquisition Workforce (April 15, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/
policy_letter_05-01.html. These two FEATURE COMMENTS discuss the policy letter and what it signals
to the acquisition community. The second FEATURE
COMMENT, authored by my colleague Chris Yukins,
offers some reactions to the letter from a pedagogical standpoint.
This FEATURE COMMENT concludes that, although
the letter’s title optimistically heralded a bold step
forward, OFPP both aimed too low and missed the
mark. The letter attempted to redefine cosmetically the acquisition workforce and describe how
a portion of this deputized acquisition workforce
should be trained. While the latter is important,
the letter dodged the primary issue that daunts
the workforce, potentially painted a deceptive picture of a growing acquisition workforce and failed
to communicate either a vision for, or leadership
of, a reinvigorated corps of contracting professionals. In doing so, OFPP squandered an important
opportunity to effect meaningful change.
Other than That, Mrs. Lincoln, How Was
the Play?—First, the policy letter ignores the
proverbial elephant in the room: the Govern4-029-660-0

ment lacks the number of strong, talented and welltrained procurement horses needed to pull the wagon.
Last year, Safavian told the Senate, “With 40 [percent] of our procurement professionals eligible to retire in the next five years, the acquisition corps faces
a potential human capital crisis. Unfortunately, because these positions are scattered around the agencies, the scope and dangers of this situation are easily overlooked. … Recruiting and retention must be
addressed.” 2004 WL 946219 (April 29, 2004). Yet even
that stark language undersold the extent of the problem. Safavian failed to acknowledge that (1) the acquisition workforce was insufficient before Sept. 11,
2001, and (2) although Government procurement
spending has increased dramatically since then, neither OFPP nor Congress has expressed any interest
in commencing a meaningful dialogue on this problem. Thus, despite a clear need for additional resources, Safavian, like many of his predecessors at
OFPP, steadfastly refuses to call for increasing the
size of the acquisition workforce.
Let’s Talk Numbers—This isn’t a new problem,
and there’s no shortage of evidence alluding to the inadequate staffing of the Government’s acquisition function. Facing pressure to downsize during the 1990s,
Congress pressured agencies to slash procurement professionals, at best deeming 1102s (the Office of Personnel Management’s “contracting series”) “non-core,”
or, at worst, disparaging them as unnecessary or superfluous “shoppers.” Without waiting to see if streamlining and increased purchaser discretion would make
the existing workforce more efficient, reformers traded
acquisition personnel for increased purchasing flexibility.
It’s easy to criticize this policy, particularly because little or no empirical evidence supported the
reductions. Granted, such a study, in order to be
meaningful, would be difficult to conceive and expensive to conduct. Nonetheless, such an effort is long
overdue.
Also, the decade-long (1989-2000) workforce reduction trend coincided with aggressive acquisition reform. But no effort was made to correlate the discre-
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tion granted with the skill sets of the existing
workforce. This led to any number of difficulties in
implementing various reforms. Moreover, the continued reductions proved devastating to procurement personnel morale, particularly as procurement professionals faced shrinking opportunities for
advancement or increased compensation. At the
same time, minimal progress was made to reform
the civil service personnel system. This, in turn,
limited managers’ abilities to (1) promote, develop,
train and retain the most talented procurement professionals and (2) effectively incentivize good, and
disicentivize bad, behavior. And, although, as
Safavian testified, a significant percentage of the
acquisition workforce is eligible (or approaching eligibility) to retire, mandated workforce reductions
barred agencies from hiring new (and potentially
younger, better educated, more flexible and higherenergy) personnel. More than fifteen years passed
without a proportionate infusion of “new blood” into
the procurement workforce. And because the demands upon the purchasing community did not decrease—instead these demands have increased dramatically since 2001—we more frequently witness
a triage-type focus on buying which severely limits
the resources available for contract administration.
That recipe for disaster hides significant downstream costs.
The relentless competitive sourcing initiative exacerbates the crisis. “[T]he increasing significance of
contracting for services has prompted … a renewed
emphasis … to resolve long-standing problems with
service contracts. To do so, the government must face
the twin challenges of improving its acquisition of services while simultaneously addressing human capital issues. One cannot be done without the other.”
GAO-01-753T, Contract Management: Trends and
Challenges in Acquiring Services (May 22, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01753t.pdf.
Expertise in sealed bidding or supply purchasing isn’t
enough. Competitive sourcing (or, often, replacing
Government employees with contractors) requires
skilled professionals to plan, compete, award and manage sophisticated long-term service contracts. GAO03-943T, Competitive Sourcing: Implementation Will
Be Key to Success of New Circular A-76 (June 23,
2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03943t.pdf and OFPP Policy Letter 93-1, Management Oversight of Service Contracting (May 18, 1994),
available at http://www.acqnet.gov/Library/OFPP/
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PolicyLetters/Letters/PL93-1.html (“Contracting for
services is especially complex and demands close collaboration between procurement personnel and the
users of the service.”).
Various reports and anecdotes reflect the disconcerting reality. For example, GAO lists human
capital—management of its smaller and graying
workforce—as a significant high-risk issue. 43 GC
¶ 177 (“[T]he demographics of the current workforce
present not only a crisis, but also a tremendous opportunity for fundamentally reshaping the acquisition workforce.”); Agencies Must Act Now to Avoid
“Human Capital” Crisis, Comp. Gen. Testifies, 43 GC
¶ 58 (serious human capital shortfalls are eroding
the Government’s efficiency and effectiveness); GAO
Adds Workforce Issues to “High-Risk” List, Procurement And Financial Management Issues Remain
Concerns, 43 GC ¶ 34 (the Government’s strategies
for managing its workforce are not up to the task
of meeting current and emerging public needs);
GAO-03-157, HUD Management—Action Needed to
Improve Acquisition Management (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03157.pdf,
44 GC ¶ 470 (like many others, HUD dramatically
downsized its staff—including its procurement
staff—during the 1990s, despite the fact that its
workload did not decrease); NASA Inspector General report IG-03-003, NASA Contracts for Professional, Administrative, and Management Support
Services (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://
www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/ig-03-003.pdf, 44
GC ¶ 446; IG-01-041, Procurement Workforce Planning (Sept. 27, 2001) (concluding that NASA lacks
enough adequately trained acquisition professionals to handle its future procurement workload demands); and DOD IG report D-2000-088, DOD Acquisition Workforce Reduction Trends and Impacts,
(Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://dodig.osd.mil/
audit/reports/00-088.pdf (“Using the congressional
definition, … DoD reduced its acquisition workforce
from 460,516 to 230,556 personnel, about 50 percent, from … [Fiscal Year] 1990 to … 1999; however, the workload has not been reduced proportionately. ...” Moreover, “concern is warranted
because staffing reductions have clearly outpaced
productivity increases and the acquisition
workforce’s capacity to handle its still formidable
workload.”), 42 GC ¶ 131.
To the extent this pending crisis remains
largely ignored, allegations regarding contractor
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personnel participating in the alleged prisoner abuse
at Abu Ghraib suggested that (1) the workforce crisis increasingly drove agencies toward potentially
problematic interagency contracting vehicles and
(2) the Government must devote more resources
to contract management and oversight. See, e.g.,
GAO-05-201, Interagency Contracting: Problems
with DoD’s and Interior’s Orders to Support Military Operations (April 2005); and Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced
Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=605367.
Nonetheless, OFPP refrains from requesting additional acquisition personnel.
Rearranging the Titanic’s Deck Chairs—
What then does the policy letter’s grand gesture
accomplish, particularly in redefining the acquisition workforce? Frankly, less than it seems. The
letter applies, at most, to one-third of the acquisition workforce. It also makes primarily cosmetic
changes. Arguably, the letter’s crowning achievement is directing civilian agencies to follow DOD’s
lead and adopt DOD’s procurement training curriculum.
Casual readers might not have noticed that the
letter is addressed only to civilian agencies and explicitly excluded acquisition personnel in defense
agencies—personnel covered by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), 10
USCA §§ 1741-46. That’s shocking because in FY
2003, DOD’s $208.6 billion of procurement accounted for more than 68 percent of $305.4 billion
of the federal total (up slightly from 64.9 to 66.6
percent during FYs 2000–2002). Federal Procurement Data System, Total Federal View, available
at http://www.fpdc.gov/fpdc/FPR2003a.pdf. Thus,
the policy letter currently applies to less than onethird of the acquisition workforce.
To the extent that no one references the addressee of a Policy Letter and the letter is not entitled “Developing and Managing the Civilian Acquisition Workforce,” it sends a confusing message.
Recall that the Clinger-Cohen Act, P.L. No. 104-106
(Feb. 10, 1996), sought to impose mirror image
DAWIA requirements on the civilian agencies. Does
the letter suggest that OFPP cannot impose requirements upon DOD? Does OFPP believe that DOD
needs no additional guidance with regard to its
workforce? Or was the letter intended to chide ci-

vilian agencies into catching up with defense agencies? “This Letter builds on [among other things,
Policy Letter 97-01] to improve the development of
the acquisition workforce by more broadly defining
the acquisition workforce and more closely aligning civilian (non-DOD) and defense acquisition
workforce requirements.” OFPP appears to formalize, and set a timetable for, the long-anticipated
merger of civilian- and defense-agency training under the auspices of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). This seems like an appropriate step,
particularly for those who favor uniformity in federal procurement. It also tracks Safavian’s confirmation testimony and the mid-March announcement by DAU, the Federal Acquisition Institute
(FAI) and OFPP that FAI would move from the General Services Administration to the DAU campus.
The letter also directs DAU and FAI to jointly
develop an 1102 certification program. 70 Fed. Reg.
20181 (April 18, 2005). Civilian agencies, if possible,
should adopt the DAU curriculum by Oct. 1, 2005.
Yet it is curious that OFPP did not direct DAU and
FAI to reach out to the private sector in developing
a certification program. (Contrast this with the program management certification mandate that OFPP
suggests should be guided, in part, by “accepted industry certification programs.”) The National Contract Management Association has certified contract
managers (CPCMs or certified professional contracts
managers) for many decades and, somewhat recently,
federal contracts managers (or CFCMs). See, e.g.,
http://www.ncmahq.org/certification. Similarly, the
Universal Public Purchasing Certification Council,
jointly established by the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing Inc. and the National Association of State Procurement Officials, certifies public procurement officials at two levels: the Certified
Public Purchasing Officer (CPPO) and the Certified
Professional Public Buyer (CPPB). Granted, both certification regimes are imperfect, and the transition
from essay to multiple-choice exam format does not
inspire confidence, but these organizations’ experiences at least merit investigation.
Cosmetic Growth?—As discussed at greater
length in the following FEATURE COMMENT, the letter
broadly redefines the acquisition workforce, which
OFPP’s training and management mandate would
cover. Of course, the acquisition workforce will include contracting and purchasing personnel, and
many program and project managers. But the let-
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ter also permits agencies to count others involved
in acquisition planning, contracting and property
management, as well as support and management
functions.
There’s no more intriguing example (to a lawyer) than the inclusion of the general counsel. Experience supports, and I applaud, any institutional
effort to include counsel on the acquisition team,
from the definition of the requirement through the
procurement process, and throughout contract administration and close-out. And permitting Government contracts attorneys to have access to DAU’s
acquisition training courses will no doubt make
counsel more knowledgeable and effective. But including attorneys (and others) in the acquisition
headcount artificially inflates the size of the
workforce. In other words, without any additional
resources, the broad definition permits OFPP to
report dramatic growth in the acquisition
workforce. This type of cosmetic obfuscation not
only masks the extent of the problem, but it empowers those opposed to responsible investment in
acquisition personnel, and, ultimately, delays efforts to remedy the problem.
Lessons from the Private Sector?—Still,
the greatest disappointment is an apparent absence of vision at OFPP. The battle cry of the
1990s procurement reform movement was businesslike Government. As part of the larger effort
to reinvent Government, reformers sought to borrow successes from the private sector and apply
them in the public context. One thing we’ve
learned is that not all private-sector lessons translate well to the public sphere. Nonetheless, it’s
strange that, despite a dramatic sea change in the
private sector’s approach to procurement (under
the more vogue rubric of “strategic sourcing”), the
Government appears deaf to the drumbeat demanding increased emphasis on identifying and
grooming talent to select, manage and integrate
contractors into organizations’ core missions.
Successful corporations no longer disparage
their procurement resources as “shoppers.” Business schools now preach that the reason contracting or outsourcing “efforts often fail to measure up
to expectations, even purely in terms of cost savings, is that most companies … make sourcing decisions on a piecemeal basis… . To realize the full
potential of sourcing, companies must forget the
old peripheral and tactical view and make it a core
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strategic function.” Mark Gottfredson, Rudy Puryear
& Stephen Phillips, Strategic Sourcing: From Periphery to the Core, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 133 (No.
2, Feb. 2005). Using domestic automakers as an
example, the authors make the potent point that
we need to rethink the procurement function.
Before it could reach this goal [of achieving the
lowest total system costs], … Chrysler had to
refocus its entire procurement function so that
it could manage the new, highly collaborative
sourcing relationships. That required the company to train and promote a different kind of
manager who was capable of understanding system economics, not just one who knew how to
nickel-and-dime the supplier base.

Id. at 134 (emphasis added). It’s hard to believe that
DAU’s desktop PowerPoint presentations will empower the existing acquisition workforce to rise to
such a level.
Carrots and Celebrations?—Finally, effective leadership requires creativity. OFPP can
incentivize the acquisition corps through less ambitious, but potentially highly symbolic and significant, efforts. Just as Al Gore’s National Performance Review converted an inexpensive framed
hammer into a coveted, nationally recognizable
award, OFPP can do more to celebrate excellence
and lead. In addition to agency-specific (and less lucrative) incentive programs, at least four large
($5,000 each) Government-wide procurement prizes
(three funded by the private sector) now reward individual excellence. The Ida Ustad Award recognizes 1102s with high ethical standards, the Procurement Round Table Elmer Staats Award
recognizes younger procurement professionals, the
ESI Contracting Award recognizes contributions to
acquisition operations or policy and the Procurement Round Table John Magnotti Acquisition
Mentorship Award recognizes acquisition workforce
mentorship. If this trend injects excitement into the
best procurement professionals, OFPP should be
able to organize and parlay these, and similar, programs into a productive sharing of lessons learned.
Conclusion—The Policy Letter fails to tackle
the most daunting issues facing the acquisition
workforce, the pent up demand for talent. Maybe
David Safavian’s efforts have just begun. The highprofile § 1423 Panel established a working group
on the federal workforce. Hopefully, the panel’s efforts will encourage OFPP to demand the long-
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awaited and badly needed infusion of new, energetic
and highly qualified talent to wisely and effectively
spend the Government’s money and guide the
Government’s investments from bargains to value
for money.

✦
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR by Professor Steven L.
Schooner, Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program at the George Washington University Law School, and a member
of THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR Advisory Board.
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FEATURE COMMENT: A Pedagogical
Perspective On Training The Acquisition
Workforce
Steve Schooner’s comments, above, focus, quite
appropriately, on the policy aspects of revamping
the acquisition workforce. I share his concerns, but
want to add a few thoughts on the pedagogical aspects of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s
initiative. As law professors, after all, we teach acquisition personnel—in our case, though, we focus
on teaching Government contracts lawyers.
Notably, as mentioned above, the OFPP letter
sweeps up attorneys in its broadened definition of
the acquisition workforce. Consistent with the Services Acquisition Reform Act, part of P.L. No. 108136, agencies’ acquisition workforces now include,
at a minimum, contracting and purchasing personnel and certain program and project managers.
Moreover, on an ad hoc basis, agencies may include
others who are involved in acquisition planning,
contracting and property management, and those
who support or manage the acquisition functions
(such as lawyers and finance personnel). OFPP’s
requirements for training and management of the
acquisition workforce now cover all of these broader
categories of acquisition personnel.
The OFPP letter stresses that, through common training and certification, the acquisition
workforce is to be “based on a framework of core
competencies that are common to defense and civilian agencies.” That’s commendable, for it ensures that acquisition professionals will be able to
move fluidly between agencies, as demand for their

services rises and falls over the decades of an acquisition professional’s career. Experience shows
that, with that mobility, acquisition personnel are
able to carry best practices between agencies in a
unified acquisition system.
The OFPP letter also emphasizes the need for
continuous learning. The letter sharply increases
the total hours of training required for acquisition
personnel, and specifically cites the need for ongoing training in critical topics such as ethics and performance-based contracting. More broadly, the letter assigns roles to various players, including the
agencies’ Chief Acquisition Officers and the Federal
Acquisition Institute, to ensure that acquisition personnel have ready access to continuing education.
Resolving Who Is Being Trained—OFPP’s
letter leaves unresolved a number of other issues,
however, which should be resolved before training
is overhauled. Perhaps the most obvious omission
is a goal: OFPP never articulates the role we expect acquisition professionals to play as they emerge
from the revamped training program. That omission is critical because the roles of federal acquisition professionals are rapidly devolving in different
directions.
Traditionally, acquisition professionals were
contracting personnel—typically classified by OPM
as 1102s—who worked closely with the program
personnel in their respective agencies. Contracting
personnel stood at arm’s length in a matrixed organization, in part to ensure integrity and accountability in the contracting process. Ultimately, an
agency’s contracting and program personnel shared
a common goal to further their individual agency’s
mission.
That traditional relationship eroded as more
centralized purchasing options emerged. Today,
self-funded, entrepreneurial independent agencies
such as the General Services Administration’s Federal Supply Service (and their competitors, specialized purchasing units such as the Interior
Department’s National Business Center) compete
vigorously to “sell” their contracting expertise to
other agencies, for a fee.
That competition for contracting work drives
contracting personnel at the “entrepreneurial” agencies to accommodate program personnel at the
“buyer” agencies. See generally Steven L. Schooner,
“Risky Business: Managing Interagency Acquisition,”
47 GC ¶ 156; and “GSA Announces Program to Help
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Contracting Personnel ‘Get It Right,’ ” 46 GC ¶ 277.
Because program personnel too often remain indifferent to competition and transparency—many program personnel simply want to purchase a known
solution quickly and painlessly—the “entrepreneurial” acquisition personnel have strong incentives to
accommodate their “customers” (the agency program
personnel) by taking shortcuts in procurement. See
“New GSA Audit Cites ‘Significant Deficiencies’ in
CSCs’ Contract Compliance,” 47 GC ¶ 2; and GSA,
Office of Inspector General, Audit of Federal Technology Service’s Client Support Centers (Rep. No.
A020144/T/5/Z04002, Jan. 8, 2004), available at
www.gsa.gov/gsa/cm_attachments/GSA_
DOCUMENT/A020144_R2QA4-j_0Z5RDZ-i34KpR.pdf. Partly as a result of this skewed incentive
system, over the past few years the federal procurement system has become progressively less open and
competitive.
With these changes, arguably two distinct models for contracting personnel have emerged. The
first is a traditional contracting official, embedded
in an agency in a tight matrix relationship with the
program personnel she serves; the second is a contracting official for a centralized purchasing agency
who is only remotely connected to his “customers,”
the program personnel who order goods and services.
The training for these two types of acquisition
personnel should, in principle, differ. The traditional contracting professional, after being
grounded in the basics of procurement law, should
learn and embrace the nuances of her agency’s
mission and operations. A traditional contracting
official adds value by integrating good contracting
techniques with her agency’s working goals and
operations.
In contrast, a centralized purchasing official—
a GSA Contracting Officer, for example—occupies
a very different role. This professional serves much
more as an intermediary between the customer
agency and industry. The CO must, therefore,
maintain a healthy distance from his customers,
the program personnel, and he must be vigilant
against pressures to forfeit competition and transparency for expediency. He must, in other words,
be both highly trained and a critical thinker. In contrast to the traditional contracting official, the centralized contracting official will gain little from immersed training in any agency’s operations—he
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serves many agencies, after all. He will, however
(again in contrast to his traditional counterpart),
gain enormously from information on his subject
industry, so that he can negotiate more effectively
in that industry for his client agencies. Cf. “Better
Pricing for MAS Contracts Is Possible, GAO Says,”
47 GC ¶ 138. In sum, the training that this centralized acquisition official should receive differs
enormously from that needed by the traditional,
“embedded” contracting official—and yet nothing in
OFPP’s recent directive suggests that training will
differ across different roles in the contracting community.
Assessing How Acquisition Personnel Are
Trained—Since OFPP has effectively delegated civilian agency acquisition training to the Defense
Acquisition University, it seems fair to ask whether
DAU needs to shift its operations to accommodate
this new task. As DAU becomes, in essence, the
sole gateway to training for all federal acquisition
personnel, DAU will need to meet several challenges to ensure that the acquisition workforce is
nimble, accountable and sufficiently well-trained to
negotiate effectively with a highly sophisticated private sector.
One challenge lies in how DAU trains. The DAU
curriculum heavily depends upon online training,
which seldom proves itself the optimal vehicle for
teaching critical thinking. As one empirical study
noted, “[I]t is the quality of human interaction that
determines online learning success.” Ian J.
Quitadomo & Abbie Brown, “Effective Teaching
Styles and Instructional Design for Online Learning
Environments” (June 2001), available at www.
eric.ed.gov (Paper No. ED462942). Unfortunately,
much of DAU’s online curriculum appears to offer
no ongoing interaction between students and faculty.
Such a program may yield procurement professionals who, despite having reviewed hundreds of
PowerPoint slides online, nonetheless lack the ability to apply that knowledge critically to their work.
One way to resolve this problem may be to look to
private institutions, which already serve as “strategic partners” to DAU, to help fill this void in critical
training. See, e.g., http://www.dau.mil/about-dau/
partnerships.aspx.
The same critical approach must be embraced
by students if they hope to compete (and negotiate)
with their highly trained counterparts in the private sector. See, e.g., Acquisition Workforce: Sta-
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tus of Agency Efforts to Address Future Needs,
GAO-03-55, (Dec. 2002). The good news is that the
procurement field lends itself particularly well to
training in critical thinking. Exercises in procurement ethics, for example—a vitally important topic
at this point, as OFPP’s own letter notes—are, if
they’re successful, almost always exercises in critical thinking. Cf. Defense Ethics Program: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Safeguards for Procurement Integrity, GAO-05-341 (April 2005) (noting
need for bolstered ethics training, in Government
and industry). On the international front, a vast literature in comparative procurement is pouring into
the U.S., and there is almost no better way to examine our own procurement system critically than
to compare it to other nations’. On these and many
other fronts, therefore, it would be relatively
simple, and vitally important, to introduce more
training in critical thinking to the acquisition training curriculum.
Fostering Risk-Taking and Exploration at
DAU—In accommodating the civilian agencies’ acquisition workforce, DAU may need to shift its tone
and approach. In its current form, DAU is a military organization with a strong, top-down management style and a focus on serving the warfighter.
DAU’s 2005 catalogue, for example, indicates that
its mission is to “provide practitioner training, career management, and services to enable the [acquisition, technology and logistics] community to
make smart business decisions and deliver timely
and affordable capabilities to the warfighter.” How
well that translates for civilian agencies remains
to be seen.
DAU’s top-down management structure and its
approach—emphasizing curriculum and structure—
appear out of step with the sometimes cranky academic freedom that marks most universities. For
example, DAU’s top-down approach tends to obscure
its individual DAU faculty members, who are not
listed in the course guides. On private university
campuses, in contrast, centuries of experience have
shown that the strength of the learning experience
derives from a motivated, autonomous and accountable faculty; a strong curriculum is not enough.
Harvard College, which for decades has struggled
to enhance its undergraduate education by reshaping its curriculum, provides a telling lesson here.
In Harvard College’s case, the problem (and thus
the solution) may derive not from the curriculum,

but rather from an indifferent and largely unaccountable faculty. Harvard’s difficulties suggest that
even the best curriculum will not be enough. To
succeed—and to keep federal acquisition training
on the cutting edge—DAU must foster a vigorous,
independent faculty of individuals willing to take
risks, to explore new areas of procurement study,
to engage fully with their students and to be held
individually accountable for their students’ classroom success.
Training a Broader Universe of Acquisition Personnel—A final gap in the OFPP letter
goes to the acquisition workforce outside the Government. Technically speaking, the Government
bears no responsibility to train those in the private
sector who contract with the Government. Practically speaking, however, the Government will be
well-served to make its training accessible to the
private sector.
A foreigner’s perspective may help explain why.
When we introduce our system to foreign procurement experts, they are almost always surprised
both by the complexity of the U.S. procurement system and by the rapidity with which it changes. No
other system in the world bears the same enormous regulatory structure; nor can any other system absorb regulatory change so rapidly. We point
out to our foreign visitors that the key to our
system’s success is the tens of thousands of highly
trained procurement personnel, who dedicate a
large part of their professional lives to learning the
U.S. procurement rules, and then another large
part to tracking changes in those rules. Were it not
for the aggressive training of those professionals,
training which carries procurement innovation
across thousands of acquisition professionals, the
system would collapse under its own phenomenal
weight.
That training, however, would be useless if it
did not reach across the entire federal marketplace.
As the acquisition system twists and bends with
new ideas and approaches, both public- and privatesector acquisition professionals need to understand
those changes; if only Government personnel understood acquisition reforms, those reforms would
almost certainly fail.
As OFPP and DAU move forward, therefore, in
strengthening acquisition training, they should recognize that many critical participants in federal acquisition stand outside the Government’s perim-
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eters. DAU already opens courses at no cost to industry participants—see http://www.dau.mil/registrar/CONTRACTORS.asp—and federal acquisition training should, where possible, be built with
an eye to accommodating students from both industry and Government. Where training can be structured to include private-sector students—or where
specific curricula, such as ethics training, could be
reused efficiently in the private sector—OFPP
should encourage agencies to make that training
easily available to the private sector.
Conclusion—In many ways, OFPP has merged
the resources available to the acquisition workforce
in both civilian and defense agencies. OFPP’s initiative shifts a great deal of responsibility to DAU,
which will now bear a combined responsibility for
teaching acquisition workers across the Federal
Government and beyond. To succeed, DAU will be
able to draw on pedagogical lessons from the private sector, some of which flow from centuries of
Western academic traditions. But the critical lessons for DAU’s teachers—take risks, challenge your
students and, above all, cherish their success—are
as old as teaching, and as important as ever.

✦
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR by Professor Christopher R. Yukins, associate professor of Government contract law at The George Washington
University Law School.
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